I am an IRC Postdoctoral Fellow at the School of Philosophy at University College Dublin. I received my PhD from the Dept. of Philosophy at UCL in 2019.
I work primarily in the Philosophy of Mind and Action. My research is about motivation in rational self-conscious agents. I am interested in the nature of desire, rational agency, reasons, and how they are related. I have been working on the concept of need, self-control, self-knowledge of desire and the emotions. I aim to connect my research with insights from other disciplines like linguistics and psychology.
Publications
- Focus on Slurs (with Poppy Mankowitz) | ±
forth. Mind & Language, 1-29.
Slurring expressions display puzzling behaviour when embedded, such as under negation and in attitude and speech reports. On one hand, they frequently appear to retain their characteristic qualities, such as offensiveness and propensity to derogate. On the other hand, it is sometimes possible to understand them as lacking these qualities. A theory of slurring expressions should explain this variability. We develop an explanation that deploys the linguistic notion of focus. Our proposal is that a speaker can conversationally implicate metalinguistic claims about the aptness of a focused slurring expression. The inclusion of a sentential operator in the sentence (e.g., negation) affects the aptness claim conveyed, resulting in the availability of non-pejorative metalinguistic construals (e.g., that the slurring expression is not apt for certain purposes). The resulting explanation of variability relies on independently motivated mechanisms and is compatible with any theory of slurring expressions.
- Desire and What it's Rational to Do | ±
2021. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 99 (4): 761-75.
It is often taken for granted that our desires can contribute to what it is rational for us to do. This paper examines an account of desire that promises an explanation of this datum, the guise of the good. I argue that extant guise-of-the-good accounts fail to provide an adequate explanation of how a class of desires—basic desire—contribute to practical rationality. I develop an alternative guise-of-the-good account on which basic desires attune us to our reasons for action in virtue of their biological function. This account emphasises the role of desire as part of our competence to recognise and respond to normative reasons.
- Do Affective Desires Provide Reasons for Action? | ±
2021. Ratio, 34 (2): 147-57.
This paper evaluates the claim that some desires provide reasons in virtue of their connection with conscious affective experiences like feelings of attraction or aversion. I clarify the nature of affective desires and several distinct ways in which affective desires might provide reasons. Against recent accounts proposed by Ruth Chang, Declan Smithies and Jeremy Weiss, I motivate doubts that it is the phenomenology of affective experiences that explains their normative or rational significance. I outline an alternative approach that centralises the function of such experiences.
- Desire and Satisfaction | ±
2020. The Philosophical Quarterly, 70 (279): 371-384.
Desire satisfaction has not received detailed philosophical examination. Yet intuitive judgments about the satisfaction of desires have been used as data points guiding theories of desire, desire content and the semantics of 'desire'. This paper examines desire satisfaction and the standard propositional view of desire. First, I argue that there are several distinct concepts of satisfaction. Second, I argue that separating them defuses a difficulty for the standard view in accommodating desires that Derek Parfit described as "implicitly conditional on their own persistence", a problem posed by Shieva Kleinschmidt, Kris McDaniel and Ben Bradley. The solution undercuts a key motivation for rejecting the standard view in favour of more radical accounts proposed in the literature.
Other
- Paper on the Semantics of 'Need' ±
under review.
I outline a puzzle about ascriptions of need. To solve it, I diagnose an ambiguity about the syntax of need ascriptions and develop a semantics for 'need'.
- Paper on Self-Knowledge and Occurrent Desire ±
under review.
I provide an account of how we know our active motivational states---urges---on the basis of exercises of agential control.
- Paper on the Metaphysics of Need ±
in progress.
I provide an account of what needs are and their relation to attributive goodness.
- Paper on Appetite and Rational Agency ±
in progress.
I provide an account of how appetitive states like hunger, thirst or sexual desire provide agents with reasons for action. In doing so, I reconsider pervasive assumptions about the nature of reason-responsive action.
- Desire and Practical Rationality (PhD thesis) ±
2019.
How do desires rationalise intentional action? I defend an account of desire that rehabilitates the ancient thesis that desires present their objects as normatively favoured (the 'guise of the good'). This work was supervised by Prof. Lucy O'Brien. The project has culminated in several research articles that summarise the key arguments of the dissertation: 'Desire and Satisfaction' is based on material from Ch.1, 'Do Affective Desires Provide Reasons for Action?' is based on Ch.3 and 'Desire and What it's Rational to Do' is based on Ch.4-6.
If a paper above is not available due to being down for revision, or at the publisher's instruction, please get in touch for a copy!
As Instructor
PHIL10040: Introduction to Ethics (Autumn 2021-2, UCD)
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I will be co-teaching PHIL10040: Introduction to Ethics with Christopher Cowley with my half of the course focussing on moral theory. I will cover intuitionism, consequentialism, deontology and a special topic on need.
Philosophy Residential Summer School (Summer 2019, UCL)
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I served as an instructor for the Philosophy Residential Summer School run by the UCL Access and Widening Participation Office scheme and the UCL Philosophy Department. I ran four sessions introducing students to core areas of theoretical philosophy which included introductions to Epistemology, Philosophy of Language and Philosophy of Mind.
As Teaching Assistant
PHILG098 Linguistic Semantics (Spring 2017, UCL)
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Final year and masters-level course on natural language semantics including topics on variables and binding, quantification, counterfactuals, and demonstratives. Course text: Heim & Kratzer, Semantics in Generative Grammar. The course instructor was Ethan Nowak.
PHIL2045 Philosophy of Language (Autumn 2017, UCL)
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Second year module on a range of topics in the philosophy of language including: proper names, definite descriptions, modality, mental content, pragmatics, speech act theory. The course instructor was Ethan Nowak.
PHIL1013 Introduction to Logic 2 (Spring 2015-6, UCL)
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First year module introducing predicate logic. Course text: Barwise and Etchemendy, Language, Proof and Logic. The course instructor was Luke Fenton-Glynn.
PHIL1014 Introduction to Logic 1 (Autumn 2015, UCL)
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First year module introducing propositional logic. Course text: Barwise and Etchemendy, Language, Proof and Logic. The course instructor was Luke Fenton-Glynn.
PHIL1012 Knowledge and Reality (Autumn 2014, UCL)
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First year introductory module on a range of topics in epistemology (analysis of knowledge; perception), metaphysics (metaphysics of objects; existence), philosophy of mind (physicalism and consciousness). The course instructor was Rory Madden.
Please get in touch if you would like to see my teaching dossier including course outlines.
Get in Contact
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Address
School of Philosophy, UCD
Newman Building
Belfield, Dublin 4
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Email
ashley.shaw@ucd.ie